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STANDARD PLEADING SAMPLES TO BE USED
IN QUIET TITLE LITIGATION
The Forms Standardization Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association suggests that the following pleading samples may be
used in quiet title suits.'
The Committee realizes that the facts in any given case may
be such as to require a departure from these samples, but it is
felt that the samples as submitted afford a concise and complete
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure
and applicable statutes and decisions.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the suggestions of
the Committee need not be followed exactly as to context. More
words or statements may be added and possibly some of the words
and statements may be eliminated from the suggested forms. It
is imperative, however, that the Rules and Statutes be followed
and complied with, and the samples are furnished as a guide to
such compliance.
It has been suggested by experienced practitioners that a
quiet title suit is too complex a proceding to be susceptible of
standardization. The Committee nevertheless came to the conclusion that the drafting of such samples would be helpful both
to the lawyer bringing a quiet title suit and to the lawyer examining a quiet title suit. The Committee recognizes that the samples
cannot cover all of the problems or all of the fact situations which
occasion or necessitate quiet title suits.
After the above somewhat cautious statement, the samples
follow:
FORMS

STANDARDIZATION

ROYAL

COMMITTEE

C. RUBRIGHT, Chairman

SUB-COMMITTEE ON DISTRICT COURT FORMS

DONALD M. LESHER,

Sub-Chairman.

The committee again solicits suggestions and criticisms from the members
of the bench and bar. It is recognized that some of the sample pleadings submitted herewith are not in common usage in each Court within the State of Colorado; the complete set is submitted, but the practicing lawyer himself, perhaps
in conference with the Clerk of the Court in which the action is commenced, can
best determine which of the samples should be omitted. Although your committee has made an effort to include many unusual factual situations, and suggestions for their proper handling, it cannot be contended that the following
report is completely exhaustive.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
STATE OF COLORADO 2
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4-711

DIV. 9

ZEBINA HEREDITAMENT AND
ZENOBIA HEREDITAMENT, 3Plaintiffs,
vs.
ARISTARCHUS AEUYIO, 4 B. B. BPHRTZ, 5 CAD WALLADERICFRMTZG,
also known as CADWALLDER CFR- COMPLAINT UNDER
RULE 105"
MTZZ,O DIONYSIUS DUAOBCX, ELIAKIM EVBPCDA,7 FIDELIA FI-1
DELIS FJEFMJT,FIDELIA FIDELIS
FJEFMJT, TRUSTEE, 8 AND ALL
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO CLAIM
ANY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS ACTION,
Defendants. 0
-'Rule

10(a), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc.

' Any similarity between the names employed in case samples and the names

of actual persons, living or dead, is. believe us. purely coincidental. The subchairman and each of the sub-members of the sub-committee specifically deny
any liability or responsibility resulting from having conceived or employed the
names shown.
A slight error in the spelling of names has been held to be not fatal to preclude that party if notice is such as will attract his attention. 23 Colo. App. 229,
129 Pac. 569. Care should be taken, however, to name each party as his name
may appear of record.
'In Gibson v. Foster, 24 Colo. App. 434, 135 Pac. 121, it was held that although initials and last name are sufficient to constitute a party defendant or
plaintiff, initials will not be held to preclude one who holds title in his first
name and a different middle initial. Thus a judgment against one A. L. Deleplane was without effect as to Albert S. Deleplane. Where a variance in name
occurs because initials and full names are interchanged, It appears that Ch. 40,
C.S.A. (Suppl.), Sec. 117 (4) (1941 S.L. pp. 607, 608), would be applicable to
actions under Rule 105 to the same extent as in any other instruments affecting
the title to the same real property.
'Although the general principal of idem. sonans applies to legal proceedings,
whether civil or criminal (65 C.J.S. p. 28, Sec. 14(b)), all names by which a
party was known should be shown in the action, if such information is available.
I Rule 105 (b), Colo. Rules of Civ. Proc., adopted by the legislature in 1941
to become part of the substantive law as follows: "No person claiming any interest in real property under or through a person named as a defendant in an
action concerning real property, to which the Rules of Civil Procedure for
courts of record adopted by the supreme court of the state of Colorado are applicable, need be made a party to such action unless his interest is shown of
record in the office of the recorder in the county where such real property is
situated, and the decree shall be as iconclusive against him as if he had been
made a party; provided, however, that if such action be for the recovery of
actual possession of the property the party in actual possession shall be made
a party." Ch. 40, C.S.A. (Suppl.), Sec. 117(2).
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1. The plaintiffs are the owners 12 in joint tenancy and itn
possession 13 of the following described real estate situate in the
City and County of Denver, State of Colorado:
14
Plot One, Block One, New Monia.
2. There may be persons interested in the subject matter of
this action whose names cannot be inserted herein because said
names are unknown to the plaintiffs although diligent efforts have
been made to ascertain the names of said persons; such persons
'The Plaintiff's title may be either legal (52 Colo. 153, 124 Pac. 187; 17
Colo. 476; 30 Colo. 56), or equitable (29 Colo. 69, 66 Pac. 901; 21 Colo. 309, 40
Pac. 688; 17 Colo. 231, 29 Pac. 802), and if the defendant answers, the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his adversary (85 Colo. 318, 275 Pac. 907; 84 -Colo. 220, 269 Pac. 901; 49 Colo. 197, 112
Pac. 542; 10 Colo. 24, 14 Pac. 54; 24 Colo. App. 392, 133 Pac. 1052; 21 Colo. App.
427, 122 Pac. 65).
Under Rule 105, however, the action is one brought for the purpose of adjudicating the rights of all parties thereto. It is not necessary, therefore, that plain
tiff's interest appear of record. 1 Am. Juris., p. 907, states: "In the absence of
statutory authority to the contrary, an instrument relied on as color of title
need not be recorded." See 73 Colo. 451 and Vol. 21, Rocky Mtn. Law Review
226 (Feb. 1949).
" In Siler v. Investment Securities Co. Ltd., Colo. Sup. Ct. No. 16458, decided May 5, 1952, the Colorado Supreme Court held that although under the
Code, possession of the property in dispute was essential to the maintenance of
an action to quiet title, no such requirement is found in Rule 105, Rules of Civ.
Proc. The Court specifically held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove that it had possession of the real estate in question. It would appear therefore, that, except in those cases where possession is an issue, the rights
of the parties could be adjudicated without the necessity of alleging possession.
In these samples, the allegation is made because it is felt that no harm can
result from including it.
"The property to be quieted must be clearly described in the complaint.
(23 Colo. App. 229, 129 Pac. 569), and it has been held that error in the description is a fatal defect (33 Colo. 349, 80 Pac. 1038).
Rule 105(g), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides: "In any proceeding for the
recovery of real property or an interest therein, such property shall be designated by legal description."

8 The naming of a person in an individual capacity will not preclude him in
the capacity
of trustee or vice versa. 53 Colo. 363, 127 Pac. 139.
9
Rule 10(a), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides, in part: "In an action in rei
unknown parties shall be designated as 'all unknown persons who claim any
interest in the subject matter of this action.'" Your committee raises a question
as to the necessity, in most instances, of naming unknown parties in view of
Rule 105(b), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., which, in effect, provides that no person
claiming any interest under a person named as a defendant need be made a party
unless his interest is shown of record. Although unknown parties have traditionally been made defendants and were probably necessary under the Code, it
is submitted that, in most instances, the necessity was removed on April 17,
1941, by 1941 S. L. p. 605, See. 2 (Ch. 40, C.S.A. Suppl., Sec. 117(2)).
"0The entire proceedings will be easier to prosecute, and subsequently to
examine, if the names of all parties are arranged alphabetically.
n Rule 105(a), Colo. Rules Civ.' Proc. provides as follows: "An action may
be brought for the purpose of obtaining a complete adjudication of the rights
of all parties thereto, with respect to any real property and for damages, if any,
for the withholding of possession."

42
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have been made defendants and designated as "all unknown persons
who claim any interest in the subject matter of this action"; 1so far as plaintiffs' knowledge extends, the interests of the unknown parties are derived through some one or more of the named
defendants. 1
3.17 The defendants claim some right, title or interest in and
to the above described real estate adverse to plaintiffs; the claims
of said defendants are without foundation or right."'
WHEREFORE PLAINTIFFS PRAY for a complete adjudication of the rights of all parties to this action with respect to
the real property hereinabove described; for a decree requiring
the defendants to set forth the nature of their claims, determining
that the defendants and each of them have no interest, estate, or
claim of any kind whatsoever in the above described real estate,
forever barring and enjoining the defendants from asserting any
claim or title thereto, quieting the title of the plaintiffs in and to
the premises, and adjudging that the plaintiffs are the owners
in fee simple in joint tenancy and entitled to possession of the
premises above described; and for such other relief as to the
Court may seem proper. 19
"1.
2.

Plaintiff is the owner of
(legal description).
Defendants claim some interest in or title to the above described real
property adverse to plaintiff, which claims are inferior to plaintiff's
title.

"Although the general rule, as stated in footnote 17, is that it is not necessary to allege the particular interest of each defendant and how the same may
have been derived, Rule 9(a) (3) specifically provides: "When parties are
designated in the caption as 'all unknown persons who claim any interest in
the subject matter of this action' the pleader shall describe the interests of such
persons, and how derived, so far as his knowledge extends."
"1Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, better practice demanded that the interests of unknown parties be shown to have been derived
as heir, creditor, assignee, etc., of certain defendants, naming them. Rule
9(a) (4), however, specifically provides: "Where unknown parties claim some
interest through some one or more of the named defendants, it shall be a sufficient description of their interests and of how derived to state that the interests
of the unknown parties are derived through some one or more of the named
defendants.".
"It is deemed not necessary to set out, in full, the exact claim of each defendant and how each was derived. A short complaint is preferable (94 Colo.
496, 31 Pac. (2) 711), and it is merely the duty of the plaintiff to allege that
the defendants claim an interest in the property adversely to the plaintiff but
have none (52 Colo. 207, 121 Pac. 171; 49 Colo. 522, 113 Pac. 494; 30 Colo. 310,
70 Pac. 428; 22 Colo. 150, 43 Pac. 1002; 15 Colo. App. 325, 62 Pac. 1044).
"1Rule 10(b), Rules Civ. Proc., provides: "All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which be
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a simple set of circumstances.
Failure to state claims separately, however, is not a ground for dismissal.
29 F. Supp. 303.
"9In footnote 9, a question was raised as to the necessity of naming unknown
persons as parties. Your committee submits the following complaint, with unknown parties not named, as defendants, as an example of extreme brevity, but
sufficient to state a cause of action:
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WHEREFORE PLAINTIFF PRAYS for a complete adjudication of the
rights of all parties hereto with respect to the above-described real
property."

Silvester Hamede
Attorney for Plaintiffs 21
211 Midland Security Bldg.
Denver 2, Colo., ROngno 7746 22
Plaintiffs' Address:
4444 Fort Lane
Denver, Colorado
23

SPECIAL ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT
1. To quiet title against possible claims of State of Colorado
taxes:24 (State of Colorado should be
for lien for inheritance
25
made party defendant. )
"The State of Colorado is made a party to this action under
the provisions of Section 52, Chapter 85, 1935 Colorado Statutes
Annotated, and no proceedings are pending in any court of this
state wherein the taxability of any transfer of the real property
herein involved, and the liability for inheritance tax therefor, may
be determined, but all parties, if any, interested in said transfer
and in the taxability thereof have been made parties hereto."
2. To take care of a break in the chain of title resulting from
the death of one of the fee owners and no subsequent evidence of
11, Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides: "Every pleading of a party
21Rule
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record
in his individual name, whose address and that of the party shall be stated."
11Since the Determination of Interests samples were published in the August,
1951, Dicta, Hasede has become a partner in the firm of Kojhiu and Hasede,
and has moved from the First Majestic-Equitable Building into more spacious
quarters.
23 To be added
as separate numbered paragraphs if the factual situation
demands. It must be recognized that the following samples make provision for
only a few of the unusual factual circumstances, which, from time to time, occur
in actions in ren. These pleading samples are only suggestive forms, not
soporific panaceas.
"' Should not be used unless there is knowledge of the death of one or more
of the named defendants, such as where evidence of such death appears of
record.
I Service should be had upon the attorney general, as provided in Ch. 85,
C.S.A., Sec. 52, which reads as follows: "Actions may be brought against the
state by any interested person for the purpose of quieting the title to any property against the lien or claim of lien of any tax or taxes under this chapter,
or for the purpose of having it determined that any property is not subject to
any lien for taxes, nor chargeable with any tax under this chapter. No such
action shall be maintained where any proceedings are pending in any Court
of this state wherein the taxability of such transfer and the liability therefor,
and the amount thereof, may be determined. All parties interested in said
transfer and in the taxability thereof shall be made parties thereto, and any
interested person who refuses to join as plaintiff therein may be a defendant.
Summons for the state in such action shall be served upon the attorney general."
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heirship :2 (Decedent, 27 and all persons who are or who claim to
be heirs, 2S should be made parties defendant, even though said
heirs have previously conveyed.)
"As particularly as known or can by due diligence be ascer-'
tained, the defendant Alphonso Abiathar Grthvlm died intestate,
at Sunlit Beach, California, on or about the first day of October,
1947, his last place of residence having been Sunlit Beach, California; the names, addresses, and relationships to the decedent of
all the heirs entitled to any interest in the real property herein
described are:
RelationName
Address
ship Interest
Beatrice Bridget Grthvlm
00 Nought St.,
Wife
1/2
Sunlit Beach,
California
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn 11 Waan Ave.,
Daughter
/
South Saguache,
Colorado
Darius Dexter Grthvlm
22 Tughe St.,
Son
V8

Choo Choo,
Ephraim Enos Grthvlm
Fidelia Faustina Grthvlm

Colorado
00 Nought St.,
Sunlit Beach,
California
00 Nought St.,
Sunlit Beach,
California

Son

1/8

Daughter

'/,

3. To eliminate homestead interest improperly conveyed:
(The known fee owner, his or her known spouse, 29 and the person
filing the homestead entry should be made defendants; in addi: Patton on Titles, Sec. 288, pp. 903-905, provides:

"In

states where un-

known parties may be joined as defendants, the matter (heirship) can be determined in actions of right, for partition or to quiet title.".
"Although there may be a question as to the advisability of naming as a
party defendant an unknown decedent (98 Mont. 291, 39 Pac. 2d 186), it is felt
best to name such deceased person so that all persons claiming through him
will be included as unknown persons.
I Service upon a natural person, under the age of 18 years, within this state,
shall be had by delivering a copy of summons to him and a copy thereof to his
father, mother, or guardian, or if there be none in the state, then by delivering
a copy thereof to any person in whose care or control he may be, or with whom
he resides, or in whose service he is employed. Rule 4(e) (2), Colo. Rules Civ.
Proc.
- If the death of the husband appears of record, and the wife subsequently
conveys without showing any change of name, there is probably a presumption
that the wife continued unmarried following the husband's death and was a
single person at the time of the conveyance. No such presumption attaches,
however, if the wife dies first and the husband later conveys because a remarriage by the husband would not result in a change of his name.
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tion, the unknown spouses of such parties should be made defendants.)
"Certain of the defendants claim, or may claim, an interest
in and to the real property herein described, adverse to plaintiffs, by reason of a certain homestead entry appearing in book
A4567, at page 98765, of the records of the Clerk and Recorder
of the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado ;30 there are,
or may be, certain persons who claim, or may claim, an interest
in and to the real property herein described, adverse to plaintiffs,
by reason of said homestead entry, as spouses of such named defendants; the names of such spouses cannot be inserted herein
because such names are unknown to plaintiffs, but such persons
have been made defendants and designated as "all unknown
spouses of Gamaliel Hezekiah Iyslkpo, and of Griselda Hortensia

Iyslkpo."

31

4. To cancel tax certificates shown to be outstanding: (the
county treasurer, by name and official title, as well as the persons
to whom such tax certificates were issued, 32 or assigned, must be
"The following certificates of tax sale remain outstanding on
the records of the Treasurer of the City and County of Denver,
State of Colorado:
1. Certificate No. 51-H377--dated November 14, 1852-issued
on sale for taxes of 1851;
2. Certificate No. 77-3H15--dated November 19, 1878-issued
on sale for taxes of 1877;
such certificates of tax sale no longer constitute a lien against the
real property herein described and should be cancelled."
5. To quiet title against an expired or dissolved corporation ;
"Although it is not necessary to allege the exact claim of each defendant
and how each was derived, it is considered better practice to make such allegation when special or unusual matters appear.
"The suit would probably not be subject to attack if proper parties were
made defendants but no special allegation such as here suggested was included
in the complaint.
vIf a municipal corporation is a necessary party, service shall be had on
the mayor or clerk of such corporation. (Rule 4(e) (6), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc.).
If a county is a necessary party, service shall be had on the county clerk or
his chief deputy. (Rule 4(e) (7), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc.).
made defendants.)
"To quiet title against a corporation no longer in active business, an expired or dissolved corporation should be carefully distinguished from a defunct
corporation. If the corporation is declared defunct by the Secretary of State,
the corporation, as an entity, may still hold, sell and convey real estate.
Ch. 40, C.S.A., Sec. 83. A defunct corporation, therefore, is sued and service is
obtained precisely as though the corporation were in good standing. The title
to real estate of an expired or dissolved corporation, vests in the directors acting last before dissolution. Ch. 40, C.S.A., Sec. 66. See also Ch. 40, C.S.A.,
Sec. 62.
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no special allegations in the complaint are necessary, but the former
corporation 3 and each of the last directors 35 should be named
as parties defendant.
(USE CAPTION AND FULL TITLE 36)
7
SUMMONS 3
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
To the above named Defendants, GREETING:
You are hereby summoned and required to file with the clerk
an answer to the complaint within 20 days after service of this
summons upon you. If you fail so to do, judgment by default will
be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
If service upon you is made outside the State of Colorado, or
by publication, or if a copy of the complaint be not served upon
you with this summons, you are required to file your answer to
the complaint within 30 days after service of this summons upon

you.

This is an action to quiet title to Plot one, Block one, New
Monia, in the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado. 38
39
Dated January32, 1953.
IMA DE MOPUBLICAN
Clerk of the District Court 40
By Q. D. Istrictcap
Deputy Clerk
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 Midland Security Bldg.
Denver 2, Colo.,
(SEAL OF THE COURT)
ROngno 7746

14If the entity is not designated as a corporation in the record title, it might
be well to include the term "partners".
'The directors should be designated in the title as follows: "Jothain J.
Jbycxdw, Leander L. Levfug, and Manasseh M. i1htisjr, all three as surviving
directors and trustees of Nkglpmon Co., formerly a Colorado corporation."
" The summons cannot be considered a subsequent pleading within the
meaning of Rule 10(a), so that an abbreviated title cannot be used. The Court
would not have jurisdiction over any person not named in the title appearing
on the summons. Rule 4(c), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc.
'Rule 4(c), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides in part: "The summons shall
contain the name of the court, the names or designation of the parties to the
action, the county in which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state
the time within which the defendant is required to appear and defend, and shall
notify hint that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be
entered against him.".
'Rule 4(c), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., further provides: "If the summons be
served without a copy of the complaint, or by publication, the summons shall
briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded.". See also 59 Colo.
504; 6 Colo. 388.
'Obviously fictitious.
4'Rule 4(b), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides in part: "The summons may
be signed and issued by the clerk, under the seal of the Court, or it may be
signed and issued by the attorney for the plaintiff.".
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(USE CAPTION)
ZEBINA HEREDITAMENT,

et al,
Plaintiffs,

41

J

MOTION FOR
PUBLICATION 42

ARISTARCHUS AEUYIO, et al,
Defendants.1

The plaintiff moves for an order for service by publication
upon all of the defendants not otherwise served, and states:
The facts authorizing such service are as follows:43 this is
an action affecting specific property and is a proceeding in rem;
the defendants to be served by publication are unknown persons,
(or are domestic corporations44 which cannot be served because
41Rule 10(a), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides in part: "In the complaint
the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but in other
pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with

an appropriate indication of other parties.".
42Rule 4(g) (2) provides: "Service by publication may be had on the following parties: (i) unknown parties. (ii) domestic corporations, when such
corporation cannot be served because no person can be found upon whom such
service can be made. (iii) foreign corporations, when such corporation has not
appointed a statutory agent for process or when the agent appointed cannot be
found at the address stated in such appointment. (iv) non-residents of the
state; persons who have departed from the state without intention of returning;
persons who conceal themselves to avoid service of process; or persons whose
whereabouts are unknown and who cannot be served by personal service in
the state.".
Rule 4(h), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., effective August 18, 1951, provides: "The
party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion verified by
the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order of publication.
It shall state the facts authorizing such service, and shall show the efforts, if
any, that have been made to obtain personal service within this state and shall
give the address, or last known address, of each person to be served or shall
state that (the same is) HIS ADDRESS AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESS ARE
unknown. The court shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due
diligence has been used to obtain personal service within this state, or that
efforts to obtain the same would have been to no avail, shall order publication
of the process in a newspaper published in the county in which the action is
pending. Such publication shall be made for four weeks. Within (10) 15 days
after the order the clerk shall mail a copy of the process to each person whose
address OR LAST KNOWN ADDRESS has been stated in the motion. Service
shall be complete on the day of the last publication. If no newspaper be published in the county, the court shall designate one in some adjoining county.".
11The omission of any of the requirements contained in the Rules is fatal
(24 Colo. App. 514; 24 Colo. App. 517; 25 Colo. App. 129, 131; 109 Colo. 567).
Any decree based on an insufficient motion of publication is a nullity (23 Colo.
App. 53) and may be collaterally attacked (22 Colo. App. 603; 23 Colo. App.
220; 48 Colo. 419).
"The statement that "the whereabouts of the defendant are unknown and
he cannot be served by personal service in the State of Colorado" will not apply
to corporations. 25 Colo. App. 129 held that a domestic corporation cannot be
absent from the state, or conceal itself to avoid service of process.
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no person can be found upon whom service can be made, 45 ) (or 46
are foreign corporations47 which have not appointed an agent for
process who can be found at the address stated in such appointment, 45) (or are non-residents of the State of Colorado,45 ) (or have
departed from the State without intention of returning,45) or are
persons whose whereaboute are unknown and who cannot be served
by personal service in the State of Colorado.
That search has been made of the public records of the City
and County of Denver,48 State of Colorado, and of the telephone
and other available directories; various inquiries have been made
from persons who might have information concerning the defendants; endeavors have been made to serve defendants personally
at any Colorado addresses available; but said efforts have been
to no avail.
The addresses, or last known addresses, of the following defendants are as herein stated:
Cadwallader Cfrmtzg
Cadwalider Cfrmtzg
CadwalladerCfrmtzz
Dionysius Duaobcx
Eliakim Evbpcda

Denver, Colorado
Denver, Colorado
Denver, Colorado
123 Fourth St., Los Angeles,
California
c/o Nakum Nmmm, Second Colorado National Bank, Denver,

Colorado 4)
Fidelia Fidelis Fjefmjt
Denver, Colorado
FideliaFidelis Fjefmjt, Trustee Denver, Colorado

Should be omitted where inapplicable.
Although grounds for service by publication may be stated in the disjunctive (25 Colo. App. 129; 67 Colo. 189; 53 Colo. 346), the attorney should use care
to state all applicable grounds.
41 It
should be noted that the facts authorizing the service applicable to
domestic corporations do not apply to foreign corporations. Care should be
taken, in service on foreign corporations, to comply strictly with the wording
of Rule 4(g) (2) (iii), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc.
49 Only
the records of the county in which the action is brought need be
searched. 94 Colo. 459.
Although not necessarily a residence, an address is a direction at which
or through which a person may be located. (50 N.E. 2d 633 (Mass.)).
4
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49

and last known adand, except as herein stated, that the 5address
1
dress 50 of each defendant is unknown.
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
SS
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERs
Silvester Hasede, states: that he is the attorney for and makes
this vertification in behalf of the above-named plaintiffs; that he
has read the foregoing motion; and that the facts therein stated
are true. 5
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 37th day of January,
1953.
My commission expires September 20, 1953.
Sally N. Doakes
Notary Public
(SEAL)
60

Prior to August 18, 1951, there was a degree of confusion existing over

the wording of the former Rule 4(h). The Supreme Court clarified the matter
by amending Rule 4(h) to read: ". . . or shall state that his address and last
known address are unknown." A statement that the defendant's address is
unknown is insufficient, it must also be stated that the last known address is
unknown. See 71 S.W. 2d 833 (Mo.); 132 Fed. 2d 677.
51 Under former Code, Sec. 45, it was sufficient if the affidavit stated that
the residence, whereabouts, and post office address were unknown to the affiant.
In construing a requirement similar to ours, however, it was said in Glenn v.
Hollub, 36 Fed. Supp. 941, 942, that the plaintiff is required to ascertain at his
peril, the last known address of the defendant as a matter of fact.". See also
154 Atl. 255; 57 N.E. 2d 819; 211 N.W. 916, 57 A.L.R. 1218. Any failure to
determine a last known address, when one is available, will, accordingly, result
in a failure to comply with the rule. A statement that the residence, address,
whereabouts, and post office address are unknown is not a statement, as required, that the last known address is unknown.
Although Bar Association Title Standard No. 69 provides as follows:
"Problem: Marketability of title is dependent upon a quiet title
suit. The recorded instruments affecting the title in the office of the
Clerk and Recorder disclose no address of a defendant, and the motion
for publication states that the address, and last known address of the
defendant are unknown. The motion and other proceedings are on their
face in all respects in compliance with the rules: Even if the attorney
examining the title knows of an address or has been able to discover an
address not shown in said records of the recorder's office affecting said
title, should the title be passed as marketable? ANSWER: Yes. MEMO:
The above Standard is not intended to prescribe the duties of the attorney bringing a quiet title suit."
The duties of the attorney bringing a quiet title suit to ascertain and state all
addresses and last known addresses is not diminished.
".In 25 Colo. App. 219, an affidavit for publication which was made on information and belief was held not to comply with the requirements of law for that
reason. A verification should, accordingly, be made positively and not on information and belief.
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(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
ORDER FOR PUBLICATION AND MAILING
THIS MATTER coming on to be heard, and the Court being
satisfied that due diligence has been used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain the same would
have been to no avail,5 3 it is ordered that the Summons herein be
published in The Denver Clarion, a newspaper published in the
City and County of Denver, State of Colorado,14 for four weeks,55
and that the Clerk of this Court mail a copy of the Summons to
each person whose address or last known address was stated in
the Motion for Publication.
Done in open court this 39th day of January, 1953.56
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OF COPY OF PROCESS
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed a copy of Summons in this action with postage prepaid thereon to each person
hereinafter named at the address hereinafter set opposite their
names, 57 to-wit:
Cadwallader Cfrmtzg
Cadwalider Cfrmtzg
Cadwallader Cfrmtzz
Dionysius Duaobcx

Denver, Colorado
Denver, Colorado
Denver, Colorado
123 Fourth St., Los Angeles,
California
Eliakim Evbpcda
c/o Nakum Nmmm, Second Colorado National Bank, Denver, Colorado
Fidelia Fidelis Fiefmjt
Denver, Colorado
Fidelia Fidelis Fjefmit, Trustee Denver, Colorado
"' Rule 4(h), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc.
"Rule 4 (h), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., requires that publication be made in the
county in which an action is pending.
5 Rule 4(h), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., formerly required publication "at least
once a week for 4 successive weeks". Effective February 26, 1944, the rule was
amended, in this provision, to its present requirement of 4 weeks, which means
5 insertions. See Dicta XIX, no. 9, p. 231, for an article by H. D. Henry, and
Dicta XXI, no. 3, p. 62, for an article by J. P. Helman.
There is no such date as January 39, 1953.
" Although it is the custom of the clerks of the Courts to list each person
to whom summons was mailed, it is the opinion of the committee that the certificate would be sufficient if it showed mailing to "each person whose address or
last known address was stated in the motion for publication at such address".
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Dated January 39th, 1953.r s
Ima De Mopublican
CLERK OF THE COURT
By Q. D. Istrictcap
Deputy Clerk
(SEAL OF THE COURT)
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
DISCLAIMER 9
The Defendant, City and County of Denver, disclaims any
right, title, or interest in and to the property described in the
complaint herein.
Wherefore, this Defendant prays that he may go hence without costs.
F. Lunkeynum Berten
Attorney for Defendant
City and County of Denver
Municipal Bldg., Denver, Colo.,
MA. 1133

Defendant's address:
Municipal Bldg., Denver, Colo.
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TI;TLE)
AFFIDAVIT RE MILITARY SERVICE 60
5sBy an amendment effective August 18, 1951, the former time of ten days,
within which to mail, was extended to fifteen days. Among other things, this
will frequently permit the mailing of printed summons prepared by the newspaper of publication rather than illegible carbon copies.
"Rule 105(c), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., provides in part: "If any defendant
in such action disclaims in his answer any interest in the property or allows
judgment to be taken against him without answering, the plaintiff shall not
recover costs against him, unless the Court shall otherwise direct . . .".
0U.S.C.A. (suppl.), Section 520 (1), provides as follows: "In any action or
proceeding commenced in any court, if there shall be a default of any appearance by the defendant, the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall file in the
court an affidavit setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not in military service. If unable to file such affidavit plaintiff shall in lieu thereof file
an affidavit setting forth either that the defendant is in the military service or
that plaintiff is not able to determine whether or not defendant is in such
service. If an affidavit is not filed showing that the defendant is not in the
military service, no judgment shall be entered without first securing an order
of court directing such entry, and no such order shall be made if the defendant
is in such service until after the court shall have appointed an attorney to represent defendant and protect his interest, and the court shall on application make
such appointment. Unless it appears that the defendant is not in such service
the court may require, as a condition before judgment is entered, that the
plaintiff file a bond approved by the court conditioned to indemnify the defendant, if in military service, against any loss or damage that he may suffer
by reason of any judgment should the judgment be thereafter set aside in whole
or in part. And the court may make such other and further order or enter such
judgment as in its opinion may be necessary to protect the rights of the defendant under this Act."
The above statute was adopted in substance as Rule XXIII of the Denver
District Court.
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Silvester Hasede, of lawful age, states:
That he is the attorney for the plaintiffs in the above entitled
action;61 that he is unable to determine 02 whether or not any of
the defendants are in military service of the United States or in
the military service of any nation with which the United States
may be allied in the prosecution of the war, or have been ordered
to report for such military service or for induction into such
military service.65
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
STATE OF COLORADO
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER

ss
"

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 99th day of January,

1953.64

My commission expires September 20, 1953.
Sally N. Doakes
Notary Public
(SEAL)
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY AND
FOR ORDER FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 65
COMES NOW Silvester Hasede in behalf of the plaintiffs
herein and requests that this Court appoint an attorney to represent all non-appearing defendants in accordace with the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as Amended, and moves
for an order of entry of judgment in accordance with the provi1

Although the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, as amended, provides
that the plaintiff shall file the affidavit, the person knowing the facts-usually
the attorney-should sign it.
11In 158 Pac. 2d 907 (Okla. 1945), it was determined that an affidavit was
in compliance with law which stated that the affiant was unable to determine
whether defendants were engaged in military service. If the affidavit states that
the defendants are not in such military service, the facts upon which the
affidavit is based must be set forth.
0 The failure to file a military affidavit does not render the judgment void,
but only voidable, subject to attack by those persons actually in military service
who had a meritorious defense and who were prejudiced in presenting that
defense by reason of such military service. 256 Fed. 38; 83 S. 190 (La.) ; 179
Pac. 831 (Mont.); 174 S.W. 2d 276; 163 S.W. 2d 607; 167 Pac. .2d 870 (Okla.).
"An affidavit made prior to default (within thirty days after the last publication) fails to meet the requirements of law. 36 N.Y.S. 2d 480; 188 Pac. 322.
The affidavit should, as nearly as practical, set forth facts relating to the military service of the parties as of the day of the decree. 18 A. 2d 714; 141 Pac.
2d 908; 198 Pac. 45; 42 N.E. 2d 176; 134 Pac. 2d 251; 22 S.E. 2d 426; 87
L. Ed. 1587.
6 Your committee is of the opinion that there is no need for this motion.
We are informed, however, that some courts require it. The attorney should
inform himself as to local practice.
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sions of said Act, and as grounds for this motion states that certain of the defendants herein are in default and that the plaintiff
has filed proper affidavit stating that he is unable to determine
whether or not such defendants are in the military service of the
United States or its allies.
Silvester Hasede
Attorney for Plaintiff
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY

6

It is hereby ordered that Sigismund 67 Agnes, 68 be and he
hereby is appointed to represent any and all defendants who are
or who may be in the military service pursuant to the provisions
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1.940, as Amended.
Done in open court this 99th day of January, 1953.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
ANSWER 69
The undersigned attorney, having heretofore been appointed
to represent all defendants who are in or who may be in the military service, as defined by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940, as Amended, does hereby enter his appearance in
behalf of such defendants and, in answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, states that he is without sufficient knowledge or information
upon which to base a belief concerning the allegations of said complaint and therefore neither admits nor denies the same, and
requests this Court to require that the plaintiffs be put on strict
proof.
Sigismund Agnes
Attorney appointed by the Court
(USE CAPTION AND ABBREVIATED TITLE)
ORDER FOR DEFAULT AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

70

'"Many courts, as a local custom, require a written order. In the opinion
of the committee a minute order would be sufficient.
Of Teutonic origin meaning: "protector of."
Of Greek origin meaning: "chastity."
'Although some courts, as a local custom, require this answer, it is deemed
unnecessary if proper finding of appearance is made in the decree. The filing
of such an answer raises a question as to the necessity of a defendant's docket
fee.
1*50 U.S.C.A. (suppl.), Section 520 (1), provides: "If an affidavit is not
filed showing that the defendant is in the military service, no judgment shall
be entered without first securing an order of court directing such entry."
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THE COURT FINDS:
That each and every defendant herein has failed to appear
within the legal time permitted for a defendant to plead, or has
filed his disclaimer herein;
IT IS ORDERED: that a default is hereby entered for all
defendants not personally appearing herein ;71 and that 7judgment
2
in the above entitled matter shall be entered forthwith.
Done in open court this 99th day of January, 1953.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge
(USE CAPTION AND FULL TITLE

73)

DECREE
74
THIS CAUSE coming on to be heard,
THE COURT FINDS:
That each defendant herein has been properly served as required by law and rule of Court ;75 that Sigismund Agnes, attorney
at law, has been heretofore appointed and appeared for any and
all defendants who are in, or who may be in, or who may have
been ordered to report for induction into, the military service as
" Although Rule 55(a), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., permits the Clerk of the
to enter ueauL,
ths
rule is not a limitation on the power of the court.
1 F.R.D. 448.
7250 U.S.C.A. (suppl.), Section 520 (4), provides as follows: "If any judgment shall be rendered in any action or proceeding governed by this section
against any person in military service during the period of such service or
within thirty days thereafter, and it appears that such person was prejudiced
by reason of his military service in making his defense thereto, such judgment
may, upon application, made by such person or his legal representative, not
later than ninety days after the termination of such service, be opened by the
court rendering the same and such defendant or his legal representative let
in to defend; provided it is made to appear that the defendant has a meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part thereof. Vacating, setting aside,
or reversing any judgment because of any of the provisions of this Act shall
not impair any right or title acquired by any bona fide purchaser for value
under such judgment." Oct. 17, 1940, Chap. 888, Sec. 200, 54 Stat. 1180.
"Bar Association Title Standard No. 40 provides as follows: "Problem:
In an action concerning real estate brought under Rule 105, is it necessary that
the written decree of court designate the names of all the parties to the proceeding? Answer: Yes.
Note: The rules provide that the caption of the complaint shall include the
names of all parties but that in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the
name of the first party on each side. A decree of court is not a pleading.
Unless the recorded decree is a proceeding, affecting title to real property,
designates all of the parties defendant, an examination of the abstract would
not disclose whether or not all necessary parties were made defendants in the
action. In other words, a complete record title would not be shown in the
recorder's office."
"Under the provisions of Rule 55(f), Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., proof of service
and failure to plead must be made and the court must require proof of the claim.
'A recitation in the decree is not conclusive if the record discloses lack of
jurisdiction. 48 Colo. 419; 22 Colo. App. 612.
Cuur
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defined by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as
Amended; that this is an action in rem affecting specific real
property; that the court has jurisdiction of all parties to this
suit and of the subject matter thereof; that the allegations of
the complaint are true; that every claim made by said defendants
is unlawful and without right; that no defendant 76 herein has
any title or interest in or to the property described herein or any
part thereof; therefore:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Zabina
Hereditament and Zenobia Hereditament, Plaintiffs, at the time
of the commencement of this proceeding,77 were, and they now
are, the owners in fee simple, in joint tenancy, with right to possession,78 of the real property situate in the City and County of
Denver; State of Colorado, described as follows:
Plot one, Block one, New Monia
that complete fee simple title in and to said real property be and
the same hereby is quieted in and to the above persons, and that
each of the defendants has no right, title, or interest in or to the
said real property or any part thereof, and that they are forever
enjoined 79 from asserting any claim, right, title, or interest in
or to the said real property or any part thereof.8 0
Done in open Court this 99th day of January, 1953.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge
Approved as to form.
Fee received.
Sigismund Agnes
Military Attorney
7'A decree in which a person having claim or title is not summoned or made
a party defendant or does not appear is without effect as to such party. 21 Colo.
App. 427; 22 Colo. App. 386.
nBar Association Title Standard No. 71 provides as follows: "Problem: "A"
commences Quiet Title proceedings, but thereafter and before final decree is entered "A" conveys the property to "B" by warranty, quit claim or other deed. "B"
is not substituted as a party to the Quiet Title proceedings. Final decree is entered finding that 'plaintiff is the owner and in possession' of the real property.
Is B's title merchantable? Answer: Yes."
" Although
the right to possession is not a necessity for an action under
Rule 105, the decree should find such right if it be the fact.
'9The decree bars the defendants and all persons who claim under them
from asserting any further claim to the real estate. 63 Colo. 222.
049 C.J.S. 837 provides as follows: "It will be presumed, in consonance
with the presumptions of regularity and validity, that plaintiff was entitled to
maintain the action; that all the proceedings were regular, and all jurisdictional
steps were taken; that all necessary parties were represented; that an appearance by an attorney was authorized; that the judgment was supported by the
pleadings and proof; that all matters covered by the judgment were in fact
litigated by the parties; that some disposition was made of every defendant in
the case." And also at page 869: "Recitals in a judgment are presumed to be
true and correct unless contradicted by other parts of the record."
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URANIUM MINING CLAIMS STAKED ON PRIOR
FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASEHOLDS
WILLIAM G. WALDECK
of The Montrose Bar

Uranium ore production on the Colorado Plateau has been a
tenuous occupation fraught with uncertainty for the independent
miner. With the awesome discovery during World War II of the
means of releasing atomic energy, a small and relatively insignificant mining business has been catapulted almost overnight into
a vital part of the gigantic atomic energy program.
The Colorado Plateau is the chief source of uranium mined
within the United States. It is the second largest producing area
in the world. The 65,000 acre mesa and rimrock country that
comprises the Plateau extends into four states-Colorado, Utah,
New Mexico and Arizona. Over 5,000 people are employed within
this area in the production of uranium.'
Because of the nature of the ore deposits, which are found in
small scattered aggregations, instead of in large and continuous
concentrations as in other mining industries, uranium is produced
by a large number of small, independent miners.
Owing to the fact that the atomic energy program is inextricably interwoven with national security, government control must
necessarily be present to a large degree. Partly as a consequence
of this, the rights of the independent uranium miners have been
uncertain and overhung with doubt.
One of the most serious problems is the controversy which
has arisen concerning the validity of uranium claims staked on
prior federal oil and gas leaseholds. The successful resolution of this
controversy is of great importance to the future development of
uranium deposits by private individuals and companies.
Uranium-bearing carnotite ore occurs in areas of sedimentary
deposit such as the Colorado Plateau. Such areas are often also
potentially productive of oil and gas. For this reason, large portions of these lands, have been subjected for many years to extensive oil and gas leasing. It is estimated by officials of the Bureau
of Land Management that 75 percent of the uranium lands on
the Colorado Plateau are under federal oil and gas leases.
The vast majority of such leases are in areas where oil and
gas production has not been developed. The leases are granted
as "non-competitive" leases under a provision of law which applies to "lands not within any known geological structure of a
producing oil or gas field." 2
Subsequent to the authorization of such oil and gas leases,
numerous discoveries of uranium ore in commercial quantities
'Mesa Miracle in Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona," Published by
United States Vanadium Company, a Division of Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.
Copyright 1952, p. 7.
130 U.S.C.A. 226.
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have been made on lands covered by the leases; hundreds of mining locations have been staked in good faith and in accordance
with state and federal mining law; and hundreds of thousands of
dollars have been expended for the exploration and development
of the mines.
No objection has been, nor is now, raised by the holders of
the oil and gas leases to the claims and operations of the uranium
miners. Although carnotite uranium ore and oil and gas probably
exist in the same area, still the deposits of each are lying, undoubtedly, at widely separated stratigraphic levels. There accordingly seems to be no reason why the same land area cannot be
operated and utilized simultaneously for the production of oil and
gas, as well as for uranium. For this reason the oil and gas lessees
have not opposed the exploration of their leaseholds by the uranium
miners, nor have they contested the validity of the claims staked
by the miners. The primary interest of such leaseholders remains
that their rights under the respective oil and gas leases be not
abridged or impaired.
MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS UTILIZATION

The problem of multiple simultaneous utilization of land and
mineral resources of the country is one which has historically
received detailed and close legislative and judicial attention. In
our early history as a nation of tremendous land resources and
small population the problem was essentially that of determining
which of the utilizations of particular land was best for our economic welfare. With much more land on hand than there were
people to develop it, governing bodies tacitly assumed that one
parcel of land should be used by one person for a specific purpose
and that any such use would be exclusive. It was also considered
that the mining of minerals from the earth was generally more
important than agricultural development.
By a very early act of Congress, lands which were known to
be mineral lands were excluded from homestead entry and could
only be acquired under the mining laws. 3 As population continued
to increase and as more and more of the public domain became
appropriated, the problem of simultaenous utilization became more
apparent, and a policy, recognized by courts, as well as by legislatures, of encouraging simultaneous utilization began to develop.
The concept that one use of land must needs be exclusive of all
others began to be discarded.
An example of this policy can be seen in the Act of 1930
whereby Congress authorized the Secretary of Interior to lease
for oil and gas lands under rights of way of railroads acquired
under any law of the United States. 4 Another example is found
in the Stock Raising Homestead Act in which coal and mineral
rights are reserved by the government and remain subject to dis330 U.S.C.A. 201, Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. U. S. (Colo. 1887) 8 S. Ct. 131,
123 U. S. 307, 31 L. ed. 182.
4 46 Stat. 373, 30 U.S.C.A. 301-306.
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posal under the Mineral Leasing Act or the general mining laws
depending upon the type of mineral.5
A final specific example of this policy can be seen from the
inclusion by Congress of a provision in the Potash Leasing Act
providing that the granting of a potash lease on ground where
minerals subject to disposition under the general mining laws are
found to exist shall not prevent such minerals from being obtained
under such general mining laws.6
This policy of multiple non-conflicting utilization of natural
resources has also had an influence on administrative determination. Among the Leasing and Operating Regulations governing
Federal and Indian Lands appears a regulation entitled "Multiple
Development or Other Disposition of Land" which provides:
The granting of a permit or lease for the prospecting, development or production of deposits of any one
mineral will not preclude the issuance of other permits
or leases for the same land for deposits of other minerals
with suitable stipulations for simultaneous operation, nor
the allowance of applicable entries, locations or selections
of the leased lands with a reservation
of the mineral
7
deposits to the United States.
The Courts, from very early times, have often attempted to
construe legislation in such manner as to encourage rather than
hamper non-conflicting utilization of public land resources. In
O'Keiffe v. Cunningham,8 the Court decided that one party might
locate the same ground for fluming purposes and another party,
at the same or a different time, might locate for mining purposes.
It was specifically stated that the two locations, being for differ2nt purpose, would not conflict.
The early California case of Clark v. Duval 9 established in
1860 that miners have the right to go upon public lands held by others under the Possessory Act for agriculture purposes and that the
miners could use the land and water so far as reasonably necessary for the business of mining, so long as they maintained a just
regard to the rights of the agriculturist.
Even where simultaneous use would result in a degree of conflict between the two users, providing the two uses were not mutually exclusive, ways have been found to allow such simultaneous
operation. In the case of McMullin v. Magnuson,10 the Colorado
Supreme Court said, in construing the Stock Raising Homestead
Act of 1916:
It is evident the Statute contemplates that a person
qualified to locate mineral deposits may at all times enter
the homestead to prospect for mineral therein, and, as a
43 U.S.C.A. 299.
'30 U.S.C.A. 284.
'43 Code of Fed. Regs. sec. 1917.
O'Keiffe v. Cunningham, 9 Cal. 589.
'Clark v. Duval, 15 Cal. 85.
"McMullin v. Magnuson, 102 Colo. 230, 78 P. 2d. 964.
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necessary incident to this right, locate under the appropriate act such mineral as he may discover, subject only
to his liability to the homestead entryman or patentee
for damages to crops and the prohibition against injury
to permanent improvements. .
. Further, the clear
purpose of the Statute is not to restrict prospecting and
mining operations on lands entered or patented under
the Stock Raising Act, but to assure compensatory protection to the homesteader.
Thus where the United States has parted with title to surface
rights but reserved mineral rights, subject to disposition under
the mining laws, the Courts have construed the government's purpose as one of encouragement toward mining development, consistent with protecting the rights of the surface rights owner.
BASIS OF PRESENT CONTROVERSY

The decisions of the General Land Office which lie at the bottom of the present controversy, however, do not seem to follow
this long continued and often re-affirmed policy. The first of these
decisions was the case of Joseph E. McClory, et al.," which was
decided August 22, 1924. In this case it appears that a Federal
Oil and Gas Prospecting Permit was issued in 1920 to one C. L.
Seckett. Thereafter, in the year 1921, Joseph E. McClory, who
was drilling a test well on the premises for Sackett, struck a
placer deposit of gold. McClory thereupon staked a placer claim
on the ground and in 1923 filed a mineral application for patent.
In this application he specifically requested and consented:
...to accept title to said mining claim with the reservation
and subject to the right of any permittee under any permit which has been or may be granted where the right of
such permittee was initiated prior to the location of said
placer mining claim, and also subject to the right of any
lessee having a prior right under any lease of the land
which has been or may be granted, to use so much of the
surface of the land as is or may be necessary in prospecting for, mining and removing oil and gas contents and
deposits therefrom without compensation for such use
and in accordance with Section 29 of the Leasing Act
of February 25, 1920.12
The office of the Secretary of Interior, in analyzing the nature
of the problem presented by such application said:
It is necessary to inquire whether or not the granting of an oil and gas permit upon certain lands and the
deposits named in the act is such a mode of disposition
thereof, as to preclude or suspend, while the permit is in
force, the appropriation of the land in the permit area
for metalliferous minerals under the United States min"Joseph E. McClory et. al., 50 L. D. 623.
12 Ibid p. 624.

DICTA

Feb., 1953

ing laws. Sec. 13 of the Leasing Act under conditions
specified therein, gives the exclusive right, for a period
of two years, to prospect for oil or gas upon lands containing the deposits named in the act. . . . The permit
issued under this section stipulates that it is granted for
no other purposes than to prospect for oil or gas. The
oil and gas permittee has no general or exclusive right to
the use of surface for any purpose, but only the right to
the use of so much of the surface as will enable the permittee to carry on without hindrance his oil and gas
prospecting operations in accordance with the terms of
the permit. The leasing act and the permit issued thereunder provide for the joint and contemporaneous use of
the land of claimants of other deposits named in the act,
and the provisions of the stock-raising homestead law
of December 29, 1916, and the complementary provisions
of the Act of July 17, 1914 (38 Stat., 509), and those in
the leasing Acts-provide under the conditions and reservations therein specified for the disposal of the title
to agricultural entrymen. The grounds for rejecting an
entry under the mineral land laws can not therefore be
based upon any exclusive right of the oil and gas permittee to the possession of the surface .... "I
The Secretary continues by pointing out that the granting of
a permit for oil and gas creates an inchoate right under certain
conditions to obtain a lease for the production of oil and gas, and
draws the following conclusion:
It follows, therefore, that no other person should be
permitted, nor are they entitled, to initiate under other
laws, rights which would by the provisions of such laws
mature into a title without a reservation of the oil and
gas deposits. 'The patent of a placer mining claim carries
with it the title to the surface included within the lines
of the mining location, as well as to the lands beneath
the surface.' Deffeback v. Hawke (115 U. S. 392, 406).
Based upon the provisions of Sec. 2333 of the Revised
Statutes, there is a well recognized exception to this rule
in the doctrines relating to known conflicting lode claims
existing at the date of the application for patent. ...
The Department,
however, is not aware of any other ex14
ception.
Thus the Department of Interior held that should a patent
be granted for the mining claim it would necessarily extinguish
the permittee's rights.
As a result, the decision asserted that the department was
powerless to issue a patent containing a reservation protecting
the outstanding interest. The opinion stated that since there was
" ]bid p. 625.
'"

Ibid p. 626.
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no provision in the law for such procedure and since the office
was a statutory agent of the government, it could not act in the
matter in the absence of specific legislative authority.
The decision concluded:
Inasmuch as a mineral patent, without an oil and
gas reservation, would carry the title to the oil and gas
contained in the land so conveyed and would thus defeat
the permittee's inchoate rights to such oil and gas, and
as there is no warrant of law for the insertion of such a
reservation in the mineral patent, the commissioner's decision must be, and is hereby, affirmed. While the effect
of this decision seems to bar the exploration and purchase
under the mineral land laws of metalliferous minerals contained in lands covered by a subsisting permit in goodstanding, yet the Department is without power in the absence of appropriatelegislation to hold otherwise.15
It is readily seen from the last sentence that the Secretary's
Office realized the gravity and far-reaching consequences that
might result from the decision. It is also significant that the department itself apparently did not believe that such a decision
was conducive to sound public policy. Finally, it is important to
notice that the opinion indicated that legislative clarification was
the means of resolving the problem.
In the case of Filtrol v. Brittan and Echart,6 however, it
appears that the Department of the Interior had become even
more persuaded of its position. In even stronger language it denied the validity of a mining claim staked on an existing oil and
gas leasehold.
The case is particularly interesting because it not only involves a conflict between a mining claim and oil permit but also
a conflict between a mining claim and a stock raising homestead
entry. In this case the locator of mining claims, which had been
staked on ground covered by a previous oil and gas permit, contested the granting of a time extension on the oil and gas permit.
The office of the Secretary of Interior handed down a decision denying that a miner had the legal standing to maintain the
contest. The assistant Secretary of Interior stated:
In Manuel v. Wulff (152 U. S. 505), the Supreme
Court of the United States said (p. 510) :
'And by section 2322 (of the Revised Statutes) it is
provided that when such qualified persons have made discovery of mineral lands and complied with the law, they
shall have the exclusive right to possession and enjoyment of the same. It has, therefore, been repeatedly held
that mining claims are property in the fullest sense of
the word, and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged,; and
"Ibid p. 626.
"Filtrol v. Brittan and Echart, 51 L.D. 649.
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inherited without infringing the title of the United States,
and that when a location is perfected it has the effect of
a grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762;
Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279; Gwillim v. Donnellan, 115
U. S. 45; Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U. S. 348.'
It is clear from consideration of the statutes and decisions in which they have been construed that a mining
claim can not be located on land embraced in an oil and
gas prospecting permit. In this connection see also Joseph
E. McClory et al (50 L. D. 623) and the opinion of this
Department dated October 9, 1924 (50 L. D. 650).
The Department has ruled (48 L. D. 98, 99) that
qualified persons who filed proper applications
for oil or gas prospecting permits under the act of February 25, 1920, can not and should not be deprived of
their rights if, because of delay in action upon the applications so filed, there intervenes a designation by this
Department of the lands as being within the geological
structure of a producing oil or gas field occasioned by
a discovery of oil or gas subsequent to the filing of the
application in the local land office.
Under the rulings of the Department the filing of an
allowable oil and gas prospecting permit application has
a segregative effect and the applicant has priority of
right over any adverse interest thereafter sought to be
initiated. When a permit is issued upon such application, the permittee's rights date back to the filing of his
application. Hence, the alleged mining locations within
the area for which Brittan had applied for a permit and
for which he was later granted a permit were without
legal effect, and being so from the beginning they17 have
not since become valid as against a surface entry.
In the case it further appears that part of the mining claims
had been staked on ground entered under the Stock Raising Homestead Act. In considering the effect of these claims the Land
Office declared:
There remains to be considered the protest of the
Filtrol Company against Echart's homestead entry to the
extent of conflict with mining locations outside of the permit area. It has hereinbefore been stated that when
NE/4 NW/ 4 and
mining locations were made on the W
NW1 4 NWI/4 , Sec. 34, said tracts were embraced in the
stockraising homestead entry of Jean P. Giraud. Consequently, the locations were made for the mineral deposits
as distinguished from the land and minerals. In section
' Ibid p. 651.
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9 of the Stock Raising Homestead Act of December 29,
1916, supra, it is provided ...
That all patents issued for the coal or other mineral
deposits herein reserved shall contain appropriate notations declaring them to be subject to the provisions of
this act with reference to the disposition, occupancy,
and use of the land as permitted to any entryman under
this act.
It is clear that the title of a mineral claimant evidenced by such a patent would not automatically be enlarged to include land and minerals if the cause of the
restricted title were an unperfected entry which should
be canceled. And the Department does not hold the opinion that the rights of a mineral claimant who has located
a mining claim for mineral deposits in land covered by
a stock-raising homestead entry are automatically enlarged to include the land upon cancellation of the entry.
This does not involve the denial of any rights to the mineral claimant, because if he should amend his location
prior to the assertion of any new right under the Stock
Raising Act, he would be in a position to obtain patent
for the land, including the minerals. 18
The Secretary of Interior, therefore, reaffirmed his decision
that a mining claim could not be located on ground covered by an
oil and gas permit for the reason that the Department held that
the mining claim entitled the owner to "exclusive possession." The
mining entry on the oil and gas lease areas was treated as necessarily being "for land and mineral." Thus the claim would be
bound to exclude the rights of the leaseholder to any use of the land.
In the case of a mining location on the homestead, however,
the Department treated such entry as being only "for the mineral
deposits." The reason for the distinction apparently goes back
to the fact that there is no way for a mineral patent to contain
a reservation for the protection of the estate of an oil and gas
leaseholder. On the other hand, the Stock Raising Homestead Act
contains specific provisions for the issuance of mineral patents
containing "appropriate notations declaring them to be subject to
the provisions of this act with reference to the disposition, occupancy and use of the land as permitted to any entryman under
this act."
The essence of the reasoning of the Department in regard to
this controversy can be found in the opinion furnished to the Hon.
Charles L. Richards, House of Representatives, in response to a
request from the congressman for information as to the manner
of disposition of lands "valuable for saline salts, borax, potash,
etc., which also contain gold values." 19 It appears from the opin11Ibid

p. 652.
950 L. D. 650.
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ion that the specific information requested concerned gold claims
on land containing potassium. In its opinion the Department
pointed out that certain of the minerals enumerated by the Minerals Leasing Acts, are subject to disposition only in manner provided in such acts, i.e., by lease and permit systems. The office of
the Secretary of the Interior continues that prior to the enactment of the Leasing Acts, the deposits of the listed minerals were
subject to location under the general mining laws. The Department
then expressed the opinion that lands having known deposits of
any of the listed minerals could not be located for metalliferous
mineral deposits and discussed its prior decision in the McClory
case. The opinion said:
Although the decision in the McClory case went only
to the question of patentability of the assorted location
there involved, the principles upon which that decision
is based would apply with equal force to the question as
to the locatability under the mining laws, on account of
a metalliferous mineral deposit, after passage of the act
of 1917, of lands known to be valuable for deposits of
potassium, . . . On the other hand, it is in substance
provided . . . in the mining laws, that the locators of
mining locations, their heirs, and assigns, on lands subject to such location, and with respect to which locations
the requirements of the mining laws have been complied
with, shall, all else being regular, be entitled to the exclusive right of possession of, and an unrestricted patent to,
the land so located. Clearly, therefore, there can be no
room for the contemporaneous operation of both the mining laws and one or the other of the leasing acts with
respect to the same lands, if known at the time a mining
location is sought to be made thereof after the passage
of the applicable leasing act, to be valuable on account of
any of the minerals named in the acts, and the Department would be constrained to hold that as to such lands,
even if containing metalliferous mineral deposits, the
mining laws have been repealed by the later leasing act.
While the effect of this conclusion would be to bar
the patenting of lands such as those here under discussion, under the mining laws, the situation is one that in
the opinion of the Department20 can be remedied only
through legislation by Congress.
It therefore appears that the drilling contractor who happened
to hit a placer deposit of gold while wildcatting for oil, and tried
to secure a patent on such placer with protection for the leaseholder, had innocently caused the birth of a concept of administrative law with tremendous consequences to the mining profession.
The legal soundness of the reasoning behind this concept
20

Ibid p. 651.
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might well be questioned. It could be argued that the granting
of a lease for a particular purpose conveys merely a limited estate
to the oil and gas permittee. 21 The remainder and all residual rights
remain in the grantor, i.e., the sovereign.2 2 Such rights would include, of course, all minerals other than the specific minerals designated in the lease and the implied right to remove the other minerals without interference with the lessee's rights. 23 These rights
not having been granted, but remaining in the sovereign, it might
well be argued that they could be enjoyed and located, at least as
to the minerals as distinguished from "land and minerals," by
a miner operating under the general authority and license granted
by the mining laws of 1866 and 1872.24
Even if it were true that a mineral patent could not be issued
containing a reservation protecting an outstanding interest, it
is hard to see why such fact, prior to application for patent, would
invalidate or prevent the operation of a mining location which
did not conflict with nor hamper the interest outstanding. In
addition, however, there is authority in the law for the insertion
of a reservation in a grant even2 5 though no specific legislative
authority for such insertion exists.
It might be that a court would not sustain the conclusion of
the land decision. In commenting upon these decisions, many
years ago, one of America's foremost authorities on mining law
said:
The Opinion approves the case of Joseph E. McClory
50 L. C. 623, where entry of a gold placer was rejected
on the ground that its location was made while an oil
and gas permit was in force under the general Leasing
Act. The reasoning in the case was practically the same
as in the opinion approving it. Whatever may be said
about the conclusion as to a gold placer we can see no
the same reasoning to a
justice or reason for applying
26
metalliferous lode location.
See 1 Summers Oil and Gas Sec. 153 and the detailed analysis therein contained of the various ways in which courts have treated the Interest of the lessee
created by an oil and gas lease. Regardless of whether this interest is treated as
a mere license, a profit a prendre, a servitude, an incorporeal heredidament or a
fee interest in the land, all are limited rights remaining in the grantor. See also
C.I.R. v. Crawford, C.C.A. 9, 148 F. 2d 776, affirmed 66 S. Ct. 409, 326 U.S. 599,
90 L. ed. 343.
1-C.I.R. v. Crawford, C.C.A. 9, Supra, 58 C.J.S. 160, T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil
Co. v. Manor Gas Coal Co., 68 Pa Super. 372.
158 C.J.S. 201 (f); Reynolds v. McMan Oil & Gas Co., Tex. Com. App., 11
S.W. 2d 778, Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., Tex. Civ. App.,
128 S.W. 2d 471, 58 C.J.S. 178 (a); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n. v. Garvey,
Tex. Civ. App., 15 S.W. 2d 698.
"Prior Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 251, and act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91, now incorporated in 30 U.S.C.A. 22.
'Terry v. Midwest Refining Co., (CCA. N. M.) 64 F. 2d 428, cert. denied
Terry v. Midland Refining Co., 54 S. Ct. 74, 290 U.S. 660, 78 L. ed. 571.
" Morrison's Mining Rights, 16th Ed. p. 275.
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It is interesting to note that Morrison went on to say, "However, the ultimate construction of that law must be by the courts
and not by the Department." 21
The fact remains, as indicated in the first decision and in the

Opinion, that legislative clarification would be the proper remedy
of this situation. It is believed that a truer guide to legislative
intent and policy could be achieved by amendment by act of
Congress to the Minerals Leasing Act of 1920, than could be
achieved by prolonged and costly litigation.
It is interesting to note, also, that a precedent already exists
for such an amendment. As said before, the above cases were
decided in 1924 asd 1926 respectively, and Congressman Richards
had secured an opinion from the Department concerning the validity of gold claims on potash ground in 1924. In 1927, an Amendment to the Potash Leasing Act was enacted which provided as
follows:
Prospecting permits or leases may be issued under
the provisions of section 281-285 of this title for deposits
of potassium in public lands, also containing deposits of
coal or other minerals, on condition that such other deposits be reserved to the United States for disposal under
appropriate laws: Provided, that if the interests of the
Government and of the leases will be subserved thereby
potassium leases may include covenants providing for
the development by the leases of chlorides, sulphates, carbonates, borates, silicates, or nitrates of sodium, magnesium, aluminum, or calcium, associated with the potassium deposits leased, on terms and conditions not inconsistent with the sodium provisions of sections 261 and
263 of this title: Provided further, that where valuable
deposits of mineral now subject to disposition under the
general mining laws are found in fissure veins on any of
the lands subject to permit or lease under sections 281285 of this title the valuable minerals so found shall continue subject to disposition under the said general mining
laws notwithstanding the presence of potash therein.
Feb. 7, 1927, c. 66 No. 4, 44 Stat. 1058.28
Probably Congress should have gone one step further and
incorporated a provision in the foregoing section similar to the
quoted part of the Livestock Raising Homestead Act to provide
for authority for the insertion of a reservation in favor of the
potash leaseholder in case of a mineral application for a patent.
Nevertheless the Potash Act, passed the year after the Land Office
decisions stand as an indication of congressional intent.
It is submitted that an amendment to the Oil and Gas Leasing Act should be enacted to allow disposition of minerals under
Ibi p. 275.
30 U.S.C.A. 284.
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the general mining laws notwithstanding the existence of an oil
and gas lease and provision should be made to protect the interest
of the oil and gas leaseholder by suitable reservation in case of
an application for mineral patent. In addition, the effect of such
amendment should be made retroactive so that it would validate
claims involved in the present controversy. It is believed that
such retroactive effect would not be legally objectionable since it
would not deprive the oil and gas leaseholders of any rights granted
to them by their oil and gas leases. As stated before, the granting of an oil and gas lease is a specific grant of a limited estate,
i.e., the right to prospect for and remove oil and gas upon stated
conditions. A recognition of the validity of locations made under
the mining laws, as long as such locations do not abridge or impair rights granted by the prior lease would deprive no one of
property rights. In fact, it is believed that the holders of oil and
gas leases would join with the miners in support of such legislation.
A.E.C. ACT
There is, however, another matter which should be given
consideration in completely resolving this problem. A shadow of
doubt and uncertainty is cast upon the validity of uranium claims
located in oil and gas leaseholds granted subsequent to 1946 by
the wording in one of the sections of the Atomic Energy Act
itself. Subsection Seven of the Article entitled Source Materials
provides, first, that:
All uranium, thorium, and all other materials determined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection to
be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable
material, contained in whatever concentration, in deposits
in the public lands are reserved for the use of the United
States subject to valid claims, rights, or privileges existing on August 1, 1946.
This subsection provided, second, that:
The Secretary of the Interior shall cause to be inserted in every patent, conveyance, lease, permit, or other
authorization granted after August 1, 1946, to use the
public lands on their mineral resources, under any of
which there might result the extraction of any materials
so reserved, a reservation to the United States of all such
materials, whether or not of commercial value, together
with the right of the United States through its authorized agents or representative at any time to enter upon
the lands and prospect for, mine, and remove the same,
making just compensation
for any damage or injury oc29
casioned thereby.
For a while after the passage of the Atomic Energy Act,
CLARIFICATION OF RESERVATION IN

-42

U.S.C.A. 1805 (b) 7.
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there was doubt whether, in view of the first part of the above
subsection, any public domain was open for location for uranium
under the general mining laws. It was, however, determined by
the A.E.C. and the Department of the Interior that the reservation of all fissionable source materials under the public domain
for the "use of the United States" did not prohibit the staking
of a valid claim as a result of the discovery of uranium under
the mining laws, and a program of encouragement of private exploration, location and development by miners was adopted and
has been followed by the Atomic Energy Commission. Prospecting for Uranium, Revised 1951, p. 52, prepared and published by
U.S.A.E.C. and U.S.G.S.80
The question then arises whether the granting of a lease containing such a reservation of fissionable source minerals to the
United States, "together with the right of the United States
through its authorized agents or representatives at any time to
enter upon the lands and prospect for, mine, and remove the
same," amounts to a withdrawal of the lands covered from exploration and location by individuals under the general mining
laws. In its terms the reservation seems to be an exclusive right,
reserved only to authorized agents of the United States, and
unless the license granted miners to explore and locate the public
domain under the laws 1866 and 1872 can be considered as authorizing individual miners to exercise the rights reserved by the U. S.,
the section would amount to a withdrawal.
It is believed, however, that it was not the intent of Congress
that the granting of an oil and gas lease with such reservation
should effect a withdrawal by implication. First of all, the President has the power to withdraw lands from location by specific
act. Such power has already been exercised on a number of occasions. The reason for withdrawing land has been to allow the
A.E.C. to explore by diamond drilling and geological survey areas
which are potentially productive but which are not being explored
by private endeavor. To hold that the granting of an oil and gas
lease withdraws an area from private exploration regardless of
whether the area is being explored and developed by private initiative would run directly counter to the policy of withdrawal.
Whether an oil and gas lease covers an area or not, the government has specific power to withdraw an area from further
private appropriation should it be deemed necessary or advisable. 81
It is submitted that a clarifying amendment should be passed by
Congress, providing in Sec. 1805 (b) (7) that the reservation contained in instruments was not intended by Congress to prevent
3°Prospecting for Uranium, Revised Ed. Published 1951, by United States
Atomic Energy Commission and United States Geological Survey, p. 52.
1The withdrawal orders of the President affecting uranium lands have recited the authority as: "the authority vested in me as President of the United
States, and in further effectuation of the policies declared by Section 1 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, (60 Stat. 755)". See also 30 U.S.C.A. 1801 et seq.
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exploration and location under the mining laws in any areas not
specifically withdrawn by withdrawal order.
MEANS OF SOLUTION*

Representatives of the Washington office of the Raw Materials
Division of the A.E.C. have stated that they are cognizant of the
inequities created by the controversy over claims in oil and gas
areas. They have stated that they are looking for a method by
which claims staked in good faith in such areas can be validated.
As regards claims staked on leases issued after passage of the
Atomic Energy Act, there probably is an administrative solution.
Acting under the provisions of the Regulation of the Department
of Interior concerning multiple simultaneous use of land, 32 the
A.E.C., it is believed, could issue "permits," authorizing locators
to operate their claims as "authorized agents" of the United States.
Such a solution, however, would be scant protection to such
miners. There being no statutory law concerning the terms of
such permits to which a miner might look to ascertain his rights,
his entire operation would apparently be at the sufference of the
administrative discretion of the Atomic Energy Commission officials, both as to operating conditions and as to tenure. In the
absence of statutory definition, the duration of such permit would
undoubtedly be a matter of discretion. Such a solution would place
miners who had located on oil and gas areas at a tremendous disadvantage compared to miners who happened to locate claims in
areas not covered by such leases. The large companies who have
claims originally staked for vanadium would be relatively less
hampered because many of their claims pre-date oil and gas leases.
Instead of encouraging new companies to enter the field such a
solution would act as a deterent to new companies and miners by
adding yet another uncertain hazard to a business filled with uncertainty and hazard. Unless an administrative way can be found
for a reversal of the opinion and the two prior decisions of the
Secretary of Interior's office and a clear validation of the claims
by virtue of the compliance of the locators with the general mining
laws as distinguished from a validating permit or license being
granted, it is believed that legislation is the proper remedy.
Strangely, this is a controversy without opposing, conflicting
interests. It is a matter which has largely grown out of a decision reluctantly rendered by the Land Office in its interpretation
of existing statutes. The decision, itself, points to the need for
legislative clarification. Also, concerning clarification of the reservation required by subsection 7 of the Atomic Energy Act, the
Congress recognized that with the enactment of this act it was
embarking upon uncharted waters into a new field. The act itself
states, that the field being one in which unknown factors are involved. "Therefore, any legislation will necessarily be subject to
revision from time to time." 33
*See Author's Note at end of article.
' 43 Code of Fed Regs. Sec. 191.7.
242 U.S.C.A. 1801.

DICTA

Feb., 1953

A.E.C. RAW MATERIALS PROCUREMENT
It is recognized that the Atomic Energy program is of such
vital importance to our national security and well being, that the
United States government must continue to exercise a paramount
power of control and supervision over the entire program. Under
the Atomic Energy Act, however, the government does possess
such paramount powers. In regard to the raw materials phase
of the program, all uranium and other source material is reserved
for the use of the United States ;34 the sale of all ores are thereby
controlled; the price to be paid for the ore is set by the government; the United States has the right under the act to withdraw
any of the unappropriated public domain from further location;
and finally as to claims already staked and whether patented or
not, the Commission has the power and authority to purchase,
take, requisition, condemn, or otherwise acquire, supplies of source
materials or any interest in real property containing deposits of
necessary to effectuate the
source materials to the extent deemed
35
purposes of the Atomic Energy Act.
Thus by express authority, the Atomic Energy Commission
has been granted the powers necessary over such a vital program
as atomic energy development. Still there is a wide area in which
private initiative and endeavor can play its important role. One
of the declared policies of the Atomic Energy Act is the "strengthening of free competition in private enterprise." 36 The grant
powers given by Congress to thle A.E.C. were not meant to create
an exclusive government business of the mining of uranium but
rather to give the commission the power in the case of failure of
private endeavor to step in and exercise its paramount control.
The publication prepared and published by the United States
Atomic Energy Commission and the United States Geological Survey entitled "Prospecting for Uranium" issued to encourage private
exploration and mining of uranium in discussing the role of the
Government and its reserved powers in the program, states:
Because of the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act,
the Government keeps certain rights in uranium or thorium ores located on public lands after August 1, 1946.
The most important of these is the right of the Atomic
Energy Commission to enter on the land subject to the
location and remove this uranium or thorium ore. If this
right of entry is used, the Commission is required by law
to compensate the locator for the damage or inquiry
caused by its action, although not for the uranium or
thorium which is removed.
* * * This right of the Commission to enter and remove ores which contain uranium or thorium protects
the Government from, among other things, a claimholder's refusal to work a deposit.
PUBLIC POLICY IN

- 42 U.S.C.A. 1805 (b) (7).
42 U.S.C.A. 1805 (b) 5.
-42 U.S.C.A. 1801 (a).
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Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the
Atomic Energy Commission may also, if it considers it
necessary, require the delivery to the commission of
uranium or thorium, located on public lands after August 1, 1946, after the metal has been mined and separated. If the Commission exercises this power, it must
pay the reasonable value of their services, including a
profit, to these persons found by the Commission to have
performed services in the discovery, mining and extraction of the metal. It does not have to pay for the uranium
or thorium.
Up to the present time, the Commission has not
thought it desirable or necessary to exercise either of
these rights, and it will not be the policy of the Commission to exercise them except in case of emergency where
no other course of action is practicable.
It is not expected
3 7
that such an occasion is likely to arise.
The pressing urgency of the controversy which has arisen
concerning the title to uranium claims included within prior oil
and gas lease areas can be judged by two immediate effects which
it has already occasioned. The Atomic Energy Commission has
refused to make bonus payments for production from claims covered by prior leases, and the Defense Minerals Exploration Authority has refused to grant loans for the exploration and development of properties in such lease areas until this controversy has
been resolved. Thus, two instrumentalities of the Federal Government charged with the duty and responsibility of assisting and
encouraging the development of strategic mineral resources have
felt the cloud upon the validity of these mining locations to be
sufficiently serious to cause suspension of further action on their
part. In many cases in oil lease areas it has brought further private
development and production to a virtual standstill. Pending resolution of this matter, the possessory rights of the miners under
applicable mining laws and the efforts and money expended in
staking claims in these areas stands in jeopardy. It is respectfully submitted that this is a problem which should receive immediate attention.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Since this article was written the Atomic Energy Commission
has issued a press release dated December 1, 1952, stating:
Solution of the problem of assuring uranium miners
the right to mine deposits in public land areas covered
by Federal oil and gas leases was announced today * * *
Under a lease agreement worked out after consultation
with the U. S. Department of the Interior, uranium miners will be able to proceed with no substantial change in

31Prospecting for

Uraniwm Supra.
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the conduct of their mining operations. U.S.A.E.C. Press
Release No. 459, December 1, 1952.
As expected the means of administrative solution as discussed
in the article has been adopted, except that the validating instrument to be executed is a "lease" rather than a "permit".
It is submitted that all of the arguments advanced in the
article apply with the same force to lease validation as they would
to permit validation. In addition the lease contains a provision
that:
The term of this agreement shall expire, at the option of the Commission, upon failure of the Lessee to
comply with any of the obligations in this lease within
ninety (90) days after the receipt of a notice from the
Commission specifying such failure and requesting compliance. U.S.A.E.C. Mining Lease No. A T (05-1)-OG.
It is evident, of course, that the act of accepting the lease
would be an acquiescence in an act of dominion over the mining
claims by the A.E.C. Because of this objection, Section 8 has
been placed in the lease, which provides:
The Lessee does not waive any right to which he would
otherwise be entitled because of the passage of subsequent legislation by entering into this agreement.
It is submitted that the A.E.C. has made, within the extent
of their administrative authority, a bona fide effort to provide
administrative relief until this problem can be finally settled. It
is believed however that the wording of Section 8 should be made
broad enough to furnish protection in the event that the decisions
of the Interior Department should be overruled by judicial determination as well as by legislation. This end, it is believed,
could be achieved by the insertion of the following provision immediately after Section 8 aforesaid:
* * * nor shall anything herein contained be construed as an abandonment or relinquishment of any rights
acquired by lessee in and to the within described mining
claims by virtue of discovery and location under provision
of the General Mining Laws.
As clarified, it is believed, that the said lease will furnish
stop-gap relief until this matter can be finally resolved by legislation as suggested in the article.
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acute need, the Secretary of the Colorado Bar Association would
like to know of any complete sets or individual volumes which
may be available for sale.
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APPROVED LAW LISTS
The following publishers of law lists and legal directories
have received certificates of compliance from the Standing Committee on Law Lists of the American Bar Association for their
1953 editions.
COMMERCIAL LAW LISTS
A. C. A. List
Associated Commercial Attorneys
List, 165 Broadway
New York 6, New York
American Lawyers Quarterly
The American Lawyers Company
1712 N.B.C. Building
Cleveland 14, Ohio
B. A. Law List
The B. A. Law List Company
161 West Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee 3, Wisconsin
Clearing House Quarterly
Attorneys Nat'l Clearing House Co.
1645 Hennepin Avenue
Minneapolis 3, Minnesota
The Columbia List
The Columbia Directory Co., Inc.
320 Broadway
New York 7, New York
The Commercial Bar
The Commercial Bar, Inc.
521 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, New York
C-R-C Attorney Directory
The C-R-C- Law List Company, Inc.
50 Church Street
New York 7, New York
Fowarders List of Attorneys
Forwarders List Company
38 South Dearborn Street
Chicago 3, Illinois
The General Bar
The General Bar, Inc.
36 West 44th Street
New York 18, New York
International Lawyers Law List
International Lawyers Co., Inc.
33 West 42nd Street
New York 18, New York
The National List
The National List, Inc.
75 West Street
New York 6, New York
Rand McNally List of Bank recommended Attorneys
Rand McNally & Company
536 South Clark Street
Chicago 5, Illinois
Wright-Holmes Law List
Wright-Holmes Corporation
225 West 34th Street
New York 1, New York

GENERAL LEGAL DIRECTORY
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory
Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.
One Prospect Street
Summit 1, New Jersey
GENERAL LAW LISTS
American Bank Attorneys
American Bank Attorneys
18 Brattle Street
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
The American Bar
The James C. Fifield Company
121 West Franklin
Minneapolis 4, Minnesota
The Bar Register
The Bar Register Company, Inc.
One Prospect Street
Summit 1, New Jersey
Campbell's List
Campbell's List, Inc.
905 Orange Avenue
Winter Park, Florida
International Trial Lawyers
Central Guarantee Company, Inc.
141 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago 4, Illinois
The Lawyers Directory
The Lawyer's Directory, Inc.
1204 Traction Building
Cincinnati 2, Ohio
The Lawyer's List
Law List Publishing Company
111 Fifth Avenue
New York 3, New York
Russell Law List
Russell Law List
10 East 40th Street
New York 16, New York
INSURANCE LAW LISTS
Best's Recommended Insurance Att'ys
Alfred M. Best Company, Inc.
75 Fulton Street
New York 7, New York
Hine's Insurance Counsel
Hine's Legal Directory, Inc
38 South Dearborn Street
Chicago 3, Illinois
The Insurance Bar
The Bar List Publishing Company
State Bank Building
Evanston, Illinois

DICTA
The Underwriters List
Underwriters List Publishing Co.
308 East Eighth Street
Cincinnati 2, Ohio
PROBATE LAW LISTS
Recommended Probate Counsel
Central Guarantee Company, Inc.
141 West Jackson Boulevard
Chicago 4, Illinois
Sullivan's Probate Directory
Sullivan's Probate Directory, Inc.
84 Cherry Street'
Galesburg, Illinois
STATE LEGAL DIRECTORIES
The following state legal directories
published by The Legal Directories
Publishing Company
1072 Gayley Avenue
Los Angeles 24, California
Delaware-Maryland-New Jersey Legal
Directory
Florida-Georgia Legal Directory
Illinois Legal Directory
Indiana Legal Directory
Iowa Legal Directory
Kansas Legal Directory
Kentucky-Tennessee Legal Directory
Missouri Legal Directory
Mountain States Legal Directory
(for the States of Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming)
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Ohio Legal Directory
Oklahoma Legal Directory
Pacific Coast Legal Directory
(for the States of Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon and Washington)
Pennsylvania Legal Directory
Texas Legal Directory
Wisconsin Legal Directory
FOREIGN LAW LISTS
Canadian Credit Men's Commercial
Law and Legal Directory
Canadian Credit Men's Trust Association, Ltd.
519 McIntyre Block
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
Canadian Law List
Cartwright & Sons, Ltd.
24 Adelaide Street, East
Toronto, Ontaria, Canada
Empire Law List
Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
4, 5 & 6 Bell Yard, Temple Bar
London, W. C. 2, England
The International Law List
L. Corper-Mordaunt & Company
Pitman House
Parker Street
London, W. C. 2, England
Kime's International Law Directory
Kime's International Law Directory.
Ltd.
4 New Zealand Avenue
London, E. C. 1, England

BAR SPONSORED RADIO PROGRAMS
For the fourth consecutive year a series of thirteen 15-minute
radio programs prepared under the direction of the Radio and
Television Committee of the Colorado Bar Association by the Rocky
Mountain Radio Council of Denver will be presented as a public
service by the radio stations listed below.
These programs will be presented at weekly intervals starting with the time and date indicated. The radio stations have
reserved the right to change the time of presentation where necessary.
Alamosa -------------------------Thursday, 4:30 P.M.
KGIW
Feb. 19
KBOL
Boulder -----------...----Tuesday, 7:30 P.M.
Feb. 17
KRDO
Colorado Springs ..----.---- Sunday,
6:15 P.M.
Feb. 15
KLZ
Denver ------_--------.---------Tuesday, 9:45 P.M.
Feb. 17
KGLN
Glenwood Springs -------Tuesday, 8:30 P.M.
Feb. 17
KFXJ
Grand Junction -----------Saturday, 5:15 P.M.
Feb. 21
KYOU
Greeley ..---..........------------- Thursday, 7:30 P.M.
Feb. 19
Lamar -----KLMR
-------- Thursday, 6:45 P.M.
Feb. 19
Pueblo --------KGHF
-------------------- Thursday, 9:15 P.M.
Feb. 19

Feb., 1953

DICTA

CASE COMMENTS
INSURANCEMANSLAUGHTER NO BAR TO INHERITANCE. In the case of Strickland v. Wysowatcky,' Acquilla Cole
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for having caused the
death of his wife, Claudina Cole. In the probate proceedings Acquilla's representative claimed, and the court granted him the
entire estate of deceased which consisted solely of the proceeds
of a life insurance policy made payable to her estate.
The administrator specified as error the trial judge's ruling
that the conviction for the manslaughter of Claudina Cole does
not prevent his inheritance as her sole next of kin. His contention was supported on two grounds. The first being that a beneficiary of a life insurance policy who feloniously causes the death
of the insured forfeits all rights he may have under the policy,
and secondly, that it would be contrary to public policy for him
to collect the estate because of the well established rule that one
may not, in a court of law, profit from his own wrong.
The Supreme Court in affirming the lower court's decision disposed of the first theory on the grounds that this case involved
the distribution of an estate and was not a suit by a beneficiary
against an insurer for the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The
court having found that the company had already paid the administrator, resolved the case and refuted the second theory of the
plaintiff in error by the application of the Colorado Statute of
Descent and Distribution and a recent Colorado case. Under our
statute the husband, Acquilla Cole, was the sole next of kin of
his wife, there being no issue from the marriage.2 Also sec. 12
of chap. 176 did not disqualify Cole, because he was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter, and the statute only presents a bar to
the heirs or devisees who are convicted of first or second degree
murder. 3 Finally, Colorado does not seem to follow the maxim
that one may not profit from his own wrong when the statute is
also involved in the same question.
The above may be most forcefully illustrated by a quotation
from a Colorado case, Smith v. Greenburg,4 which was the basis
for the decision in this case. In the Smith case the jury found that
one Milford cut his wife's throat, and then his daughter's. After
these events he killed himself by carbon monoxide poisoning. Because of the proximity in time of all these happenings Milford
never went to trial. Concerning the property held by Milford and
I Strickland v. Wysowatcky, .... Colo.....1952-1953 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 4,
p. 50.
2COLO. STAT. ANN-., c. 176, §1 (1935).
Id. at §12.
Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P. 2d 514 (1950).
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his wife as tenants in common, the Supreme Court ruled that
her interest descended by the statute to Milford and their daughter
in equal portions. As the daughter was the next to die after Mrs.
Milford, and as Milford was her sole heir, he inherited her estate
also. In making this decision the Supreme Court quoted 26 C. J. S.
1055 and seemingly adopted what was therein stated to be the
majority view for the law of this state:
. . . The operation of a statute of descent is not
affected by the fact that the death of the intestate was
caused by the heir apparent in order to obtain the inheritance at once, and therefore an heir who causes or procures the death of the intestate in order that he may
inherit the estate at once is not disqualified from taking
in the absence of a statute expressly disqualifying him.
There is however a strong minority view to the contrary,
based on the theory that a person should not profit from
his own wrong; and it is said that this view displays a
tendency to become a majority view. To meet the difficulties arising in such a case, several states have enacted
valid statutes intended to prevent a person who has
feloniously caused the death of decedent from inheriting
or receiving any part of the estate of decedent; but such
a statute must be strictly construed and in some situations is held not applicable. A statute disqualifying one
who has been convicted of the murder of deceased does
not apply in absence of such conviction as where there
has been a conviction of manslaughter only, or the person
who committed the homicide was insane at the time or
committed suicide shortly thereafter.
Although there was no indication that Milford had killed his
wife and daughter for their money, the court indicated by this
quotation and the decision in that case that the wrongful killer
will not be denied his inheritance from the one killed unless he
is precluded by the express terms of the statute, and it would seem
that, the court made it quite clear that in these circumstances,
the maxim that one may not profit from his own wrong will not
apply in this state.
It thus appears that in deciding this case the court merely
followed its precedent established in the Smith case and refused
to enlarge upon the limitations found in the statute itself. Decisions such as these two seem rather harsh under the circumstances
of these two cases. However, the decision seems justified where,
as here, the statute of descent and distribution, or provision for
succession, is plain and unambiguous in its terms and where there
is no room for construction of interpretation. The statute operates
solely within its own terms and vests in the heir such estate as
he is entitled to immediately upon the death of the intestate from
whom the inheritance comes, without reference to any question
of criminal responsibility.
HOWARD PARKS.
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ERRATA
In the article by Percy S. Morris appearing at page one in
the January, 1953, issue of Dicta the word "or" should be inserted
in the paragraph numbered four on page one between "of the
plaintiff in error" and "in the appendix thereto".
At page eight in the same issue and article, the first sentence
of the second complete paragraph should read "If an attorney
should be worried because the period of three months after entry
of the judgment, or a large part of it, has elapsed before a motion
for a new trial, seasonably filed, Was denied, he should read the
opinion in Bankers Trust Co. v. Hall, 116 Colo. 566, 183 Pac. 986,
and relax".
In the article by Edward P. Kurz appearing at page 24 in
tke January, 1953, issue of Dicta, the following should be inserted
between the first and second paragraphs on page 26:
The Revenue Act of 1951 changed the method of handling capital gains and losses on federal returns for taxable years beginning after October 20, 1951 for taxpayers
other than corporations. Sec. 117(b), I.R.C. and sec. 23,
I.R.C. were amended so that 100% (instead of 50%) of
the long-term capital gains or losses is taken into account
and a deduction is allowed under sec. 23 (ee), I.R.C. equal
to 50% of the excess of the net long-term capital gain
over the net short-term capital loss. Thus, if you have a
net long-term capital loss it is now 100% deductible on
the federal return (subject to the statutory capital loss
limitations).
In the same article the words "Note that the old rule still
applies in Colorado" at the end of the second complete paragraph
on page 26 should be omitted.
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It's no fun rolling out of bed and trotting downstairs
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